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DRIFTING AWAY FROM TERRORISM: DOWNWARD DEPARTURE 
FROM THE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT IN CASES OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS 
INTRODUCTION 
Without understating the gravity of the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers of 
the World Trade Center, today, over fifteen years later, the threat of terrorism is 
frequently overestimated.1 Including 9/11, the probability of an American being 
killed by a terrorist in the United States, is about one in four million per year.2 
Using only post-9/11 data, the probability changes to about one in ninety million 
per year.3 For perspective, an American’s chance of dying in a car crash is about 
one in 8,000 a year, the chance of being murdered is about one in 22,000, and 
the chance of being killed by a deer is one in two million.4 Regardless of these 
statistics, roughly forty percent of the public claim that they worry that either 
they or a family member will become a terrorist victim.5 
Granted, many Americans may not be aware of the probability of all these 
events. However, even if they were aware, there is psychological research which 
explains why the risks of unlikely but frightening events are often overestimated. 
Maia Szalavitz, a neuroscience journalist, writes that: “Because fear strengthens 
memory, catastrophes such as earthquakes, plane crashes, and terrorist incidents 
completely capture our attention. As a result, we overestimate the odds of 
dreadful but infrequent events and underestimate how risky ordinary events 
are.”6 Szalavitz notes that the drama and repetition of news coverage of 
improbable events make them seem more common,7 thus increasing the 
perceived risk and its associated fear. When public fears increase, there is a risk 
 
 1. See John Mueller, Getting Real on the Terrorism Threat to the United States, WAR ON THE 
ROCKS (Aug. 23, 2016), https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/getting-real-on-the-terrorism-threat-
to-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/S3QS-JNGT]; see also John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, 
American Public Opinion on Terrorism Since 9/11: Trends and Puzzles, Presentation at the Nat’l 
Convention of the Int’l Studies Ass’n 1 (Mar. 8, 2016), http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmuel 
ler/tpoISA16.pdf [https://perma.cc/98NR-H62T]. 
 2. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 1, at 5. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. at 56. 
 5. See id. at 6. 
 6. Maia Szalavitz, 10 Ways We Get the Odds Wrong, PSYCHOL. TODAY (updated June 9, 
2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200801/10-ways-we-get-the-odds-wrong 
[https://perma.cc/CGH5-LHQB]. 
 7. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
940 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:939 
of falling “victim to the politics of fear,”8 which may result in irresponsible 
policymaking. When fears remain at high levels, even over fifteen years after a 
traumatic event, then there is an even greater risk: continued irresponsible 
policymaking.9 
As John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart write: “9/11 clearly has achieved 
perpetual resonance in the American mind.”10 As a result, Mueller and Stewart 
contend, the American public suffers from “long-term, routinized, mass anxiety” 
causing them to live in a false sense of insecurity.11 Because the threat of 
terrorism cannot be entirely eliminated and because terrorism has a “special 
formlessness” and volatility that makes this threat difficult to define, “it may be 
exceptionally difficult to get people to believe that the threat has really been 
extinguished—or at least is no longer particularly significant.”12 
With that difficulty comes more problems, particularly the risk that the 
inability to define terrorism will lead to a vague, over-encompassing definition 
whose application brings non-traditional terrorism offenders under the 
“terrorism” umbrella. It has already been seen with environmental activists 
being labeled “eco-terrorists”13 and now it can be seen with offenders suffering 
from mental illness.14 
This Article argues that mental illness should be a required factor to consider 
during sentencing when applying the Terrorism Enhancement, and if a defendant 
suffering from mental illness is found to have been a “vulnerable victim” of 
another in committing the offense, there should be downward departure. Part I 
discusses the historical background of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”) and how they have evolved to their current form. Part II discusses 
the enactment of the Terrorism Enhancement, how it changed after 9/11, and the 
specifics of its application as part of such Guidelines. Part III analyzes the use 
of the Guidelines, including common critiques of the Guidelines and 
 
 8. AVIVA STAHL, CAGEPRISONERS, TOO BLUNT FOR JUST OUTCOMES: WHY THE U.S. 
TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES ARE UNFAIR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND 
INEFFECTIVE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 5 (2016), https://cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/ 
cp_too_blunt_for_just_outcomes.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL6H-TL5Y]. 
 9. See John Mueller, Getting Real on the Terrorism Threat to the United States, WAR ON THE 
ROCKS, (Aug. 23, 2016), https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/getting-real-on-the-terrorism-threat-
to-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/3EE8-YXCJ]. 
 10. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1. 
 11. Id. at 1–2. 
 12. Id. at 1. 
 13. See Shane Harris, The Terrorism Enhancement: An Obscure Law Stretches the Definition 
of Terrorism, and Metes Out Severe Punishments, NAT’L J., July 13, 2007, http://shaneharris.com/ 
magazinestories/terrorism-enhancement-obscure-law-stretches-the-definition-of-terrorism-and-
metes-out-severe-punishments/ [https://perma.cc/TT3B-A8LJ]. 
 14. See Nicole Hong, Terror Case Highlights Mental-Health Issues Among Suspected ISIS 
Recruits, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/terror-case-highlights-men 
tal-health-issues-among-suspected-isis-recruits-1473270174 [https://perma.cc/97HT-3FDR]. 
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specifically, the Terrorism Enhancement, and identifies provisions for departure. 
Part III highlights a case with model sentencing dealing with the Terrorism 
Enhancement and a defendant with mental illness. Lastly, Part IV argues for 
required consideration of a defendant’s mental illness and more relaxed 
treatment in sentencing for defendants with mental illness identified as a 
“vulnerable victim” to another in committing the offense. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
A. Procedure 
Procedurally, federal sentencing is a multi-step process with many elements 
at play. First, all federal crimes are grouped according to general offense 
characteristics and then assigned a base offense level, which serves as a starting 
point for determining the seriousness, and coinciding sentence, of a particular 
offense.15 The guidelines provide forty-three levels of offense seriousness, with 
higher offense levels indicating more serious crimes.16 The sentences range from 
zero-to-six months to life.17 The forty-three levels are broken into four uneven 
zones, Zone A through Zone D, with Zone D encompassing the most serious 
offenses.18 
In determining a sentence, the Guidelines take into account both the 
seriousness of an offense and the characteristics of the offender, including 
criminal history.19 A base level may change depending on “specific offense 
characteristics.”20 Specific offense characteristics are offense-dependent factors 
that can increase or decrease a base offense level.21 For example, using a firearm 
during a robbery is an enhancement characteristic that brings along a five-level 
increase, and if that firearm was discharged during a robbery, it carries a seven-
level increase.22 Additionally, “adjustments” may increase or decrease a base 
level.23 Unlike specific offense characteristics, adjustments are not offense-
specific; they can apply to any offense.24 
 
 15. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
1 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW], http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEK7-
AMEV]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 20. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 15. 
 21. Id. at 1. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2. 
 24. Id. 
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After any addition or subtraction from specific offense characteristics and/or 
adjustments, the final offense level is determined and it is aligned with the 
criminal history of an offender to determine the offender’s sentencing guideline 
range.25 There are six criminal history categories, with the sixth, Category VI, 
being the most serious and including offenders with serious criminal records.26 
The sentencing guideline range is listed by months of imprisonment.27  
Once this range is determined, the court may depart downward or upward 
from the range if aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist.28 If a judge 
chooses to depart, he or she must state in writing the reason for doing so.29 
B. Inception 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,30 played an important role for federal 
sentencing. Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, judges had “nearly unfettered” 
discretion in sentencing and the system was critiqued as “lawless.”31 In 
response, Congress sought to add more structure to the sentencing system.32 
Among other things, the Sentencing Reform Act created the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (“Commission”), which is an independent agency within the 
Judicial Branch.33 The general purpose of the Commission is to establish 
sentencing guidelines for the federal criminal justice system.34 In doing so, the 
Commission’s specific purpose is to (1) provide certainty and fairness while 
meeting the purposes of sentencing,35 (2) avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among similar defendants, (3) maintain flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences, and (4) reflect, to a reasonable extent, advancement in 
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.36 The 
creation of the Commission “rested on Congressional awareness that sentencing 
is a dynamic field that requires continuing review by an expert body to revise 
 
 25. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 15, at 2. 
 26. Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 27. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 15. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 15. 
 30. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. 
 31. John M. Walker, Jr., Loosening the Administrative Handcuffs: Discretion and 
Responsibility Under the Guidelines, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 551 (1993). 
 32. Id. 
 33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.1(1). 
 35. Generally speaking, the primary purposes of sentencing are to punish criminals and 
prevent crimes. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 10 
(2006). Beyond that, sentencing has many other specific purposes, including denunciation of 
wrongful behavior, reinforcement of basic social norms, promoting respect for the law, protecting 
the public from further crimes, and to provide an offender with effective correctional treatment. 
See id. at 13. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2012). 
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sentencing policies, in light of application experience, as new criminal statutes 
are enacted, and as more is learned about what motivates and controls criminal 
behavior.”37 
Even at the outset of the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress recognized that 
it would be unmanageable for the Commission to anticipate every possible 
relevant circumstance for sentencing in any case and then provide for them in 
general, rule-based guidelines.38 As such, it laid out what a court must consider 
in sentencing while giving courts an opportunity to consider other extenuating 
factors. Section 3553(a) explains that: 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the 
defendant;  
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote the respect for the 
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,  
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,  
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and  
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;  
(3) the kinds of sentences available;  
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established…; 
(5) any pertinent policy statement…; 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and  
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.39  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), in establishing categories of defendants for use 
in the Guidelines, the Commission considers whether the following matters, 
with respect to a defendant, have any relevance to the nature or extent of an 
appropriate sentence.40 If any are relevant, the Commission shall take them into 
account, but only to the extent that they have relevance.41 These matters, in 
relevant part, include: “(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that 
such condition mitigates the defendant’s culpability or to the extent that such 
condition is otherwise plainly relevant . . . . ; (9) role in the offense; and (10) 
 
 37. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2. 
 38. Id. § 1A.1(4)(c). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (emphasis added). 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012). 
 41. Id. 
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criminal history . . . .”42 In regard to race, sex, national origin, creed, and 
socioeconomic status, the Commission and its promulgated Guidelines must 
remain “entirely neutral.”43 
Additionally, Congress included a provision in the Sentencing Reform Act 
which said that courts may depart from the Guidelines if an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance exists, either in kind or degree, that the Commission did 
not adequately consider and should result in a different sentence.44 The original 
Commission intended courts to view the Guidelines as carving out a “heartland” 
of typical cases which embody the conduct specific to each guideline.45 When a 
court is faced with an atypical case—where a particular guideline linguistically 
applies but the case-specific conduct significantly differs from the norm of the 
“heartland” cases—the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.46  
The Guidelines specifically provide that mental and emotional conditions 
may be relevant factors justifying departure.47 Such conditions may be relevant 
if, they “individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, are 
present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases 
covered by the [G]uidelines.”48 Additionally, a court may depart if it determines 
that a circumstance, although already taken into consideration in determining 
the sentencing range, is present to a degree substantially in excess of or below 
the typical amount for that kind of offense.49 Although the Guidelines provide 
specific guidance for departures in certain circumstances, departure on grounds 
not mentioned in the Guidelines also is permitted.50  
C. Evolution 
1. United States v. Booker 
In the 2005 case, United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court struck down 
the then-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines, instead making them 
advisory.51 As originally written, the Guidelines were binding on all judges.52 
Before Booker, courts held that the Guidelines were mandatory, thus limiting 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 15, at 3. 
 45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.1(4)(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. § 5H1.3. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(3). 
 50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.4(b). 
 51. 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
 52. Id. at 233. The Court in Booker wrote, “[w]e do not doubt that Congress, when it wrote 
the Sentencing Act, intended to create a form of mandatory Guidelines system.” Id. at 266. 
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the severity of a sentence that a judge could lawfully impose.53 Even though in 
their original form the Guidelines permitted departures from a prescribed 
sentencing range, in Booker, the Court found that, “[i]n most cases, as a matter 
of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all relevant factors into 
account, and no departure will be legally permissible.”54 The Commission itself 
even believed, “that despite the courts’ legal freedom to depart from the 
[G]uidelines, they will not do so very often.”55  
In finding the ability to depart from the Guidelines limited in opportunity, 
Booker examined whether mandatory sentencing guidelines violated a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.56 The Court recognized that 
the Guidelines’ systematic application brought efficiency and expediency, but it 
noted that such systemic application was at the cost of a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.57 If mandatory, the sentencing scheme would interfere with 
a defendant’s right to a jury trial because a judge could impose a sentence that 
is not solely based on jury-found facts or those the defendant admits.58  
Further, Booker concluded that although Congress intended the Guidelines 
to be mandatory, it would have preferred a system that was not mandatory over 
a system that simply consisted of similar sentences for those convicted of 
violation of the same statute.59 The Court explained that the uniformity that 
Congress aimed for in passing the Federal Sentencing Act was not merely in 
similar sentences for those convicted of violations of the same statute, but rather 
should emanate with similar relationships between sentences and real conduct.60 
Under Booker, since the Guidelines became advisory, a court is not bound 
to apply them even though it still must consult the Guidelines and take them into 
account.61 This has given courts more discretion to depart from the previously 
mandatory Guidelines. However, while courts have the ability to depart from the 
Guidelines, in doing so, they also depart from the uniformity and ease that comes 
from a straightforward, almost mathematical, application of the Guidelines, 
instead vying with the grey cloud that hovers above discretion. This discretion 
is not unchecked; an appellate court can review a trial court’s departure from the 
Guidelines, thereby subjecting it to a review for unreasonableness.62  
The Booker Court found that because a trial court must still consult the 
Guidelines and its decision is subject to a review for unreasonableness, the 
 
 53. Id. at 226. 
 54. Id. at 234. 
 55. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.4(b). 
 56. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. 
 57. Id. at 244. 
 58. Id. at 232. 
 59. Id. at 253–54. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. 
 62. Id. at 264. 
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Guidelines, while lacking the mandatory status as enacted, still furthered the 
objectives that Congress originally intended.63 The Court wrote that these two 
checks “continue to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction, helping 
to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient 
to individualize sentences where necessary.”64 The Commission itself has noted 
a similar rationale, saying that an advisory Guidelines system continues to 
ensure transparency and to promote certainty and predictability in sentencing, 
which enables parties to better anticipate a likely sentence.65 
In the wake of Booker, before any further interpretation,66 chaos ensued in 
the courtroom—both at trial and appellate levels.67 At the trial level, judges once 
again could utilize their judicial discretion to either follow the Guidelines to 
enhance the goals of uniformity and fairness or to opt for a more nuanced 
approach, pushing toward the creation of a “common law of sentencing.”68  
At the appellate level, Booker created uncertainty about the respective roles 
of appellate and trial courts.69 Because the trial courts now possessed greater 
discretion, albeit not completely unfettered, the role of appellate review had the 
potential to decrease significantly. Therefore, it was left to the Supreme Court 
in post-Booker cases to more precisely carve out the role for appellate review.  
2. Supreme Court Cases Post-Booker: 2007 
After Booker, in a trio of 2007 cases, the Supreme Court continued to stress 
the importance of considering the Guidelines, while maintaining the position 
that the Guidelines were not mandatory. Rita v. United States explained that a 
district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating 
the applicable Guidelines range.70 Additionally, in Rita, the Court held that an 
appellate court may apply a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing a 
district court sentence which “reflects a proper application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”71 
In Kimbrough v. United States, the Court concluded that a judge “must 
include the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting consideration.”72 
However, Kimbrough maintained the advisory notion of the Guidelines in saying 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 264–65. 
 65. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 66. See supra Section I.C.2. 
 67. George D. Brown, Notes on a Terrorism Trial: Preventive Prosecution, “Material 
Support” and the Role of the Judge After United States v. Mehanna, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 
1, 45 (2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 
 71. Id. 
 72. 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007). 
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that a “judge may determine whether, in a particular case, a within-Guidelines 
sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing.”73  
Gall v. United States explained, “[T]o secure nationwide consistency, the 
Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.”74 Gall also 
held that the district judge should consider all of the statutory factors of 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine if a sentence is supported.75 Gall further explained 
that a district court should not presume that the sentencing range from the 
Guidelines is reasonable.76 Rather, a district court judge must make an 
“individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”77 After doing so, a 
judge can sentence outside the Guidelines, but must consider the “extent of the 
deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support 
the degree of variance.”78 The Court found it “uncontroversial” that the larger 
the departure from the Guidelines, the more support needed to justify it.79  
Gall specifically showed strong support for the importance of the 
Guidelines, while keeping them advisory. In discussing an appellate court’s 
review, Gall held that a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the sentencing 
court committed such errors as “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider 
the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or 
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”80 If the appellate court finds 
the district court’s sentencing decision to be procedurally sound, then it 
considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard.81  
Although it is well-recognized that the Guidelines are advisory, post-Booker 
cases have maintained the significant influence of the Guidelines, both in 
sentencing at the trial level and at the appellate level.82 The fact that a trial judge 
must begin the sentencing process with the Guidelines and an appellate judge 
can declare a sentence procedurally unsound based on Guidelines calculations 
illustrates mandatory-like characteristics. However, there are advisory-like 
characteristics to offset these, such as an appellate judge’s ability to declare a 
sentence procedurally unsound if a trial judge treats the Guidelines as 
mandatory. Overall, the Guidelines have sustained a position as well-regarded 
 
 73. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)). 
 74. 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
 75. Id. at 49–50. 
 76. Id. at 50. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (2007). 
 80. Id. at 51. 
 81. Id. 
 82. George D. Brown, Punishing Terrorists: Congress, the Sentencing Commission, the 
Guidelines, and the Courts, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 529 (2014). 
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and play a key role in sentencing, while remaining advisory. The sentencing 
system appears to be in a cloudy, substantial state of flux.83  
II.  CONTINUING ON POST-BOOKER: FOLLOW-UP AFTER 2007 
In 2013, Peugh v. United States84 continued to push back on the advisory 
nature of the Guidelines, swinging toward the viewpoint of the Guidelines as 
mandatory in nature.85 Although support for mandatory Guidelines was not 
directly on the face of the case,86 the Peugh decision supported the view that the 
Guidelines are very close to law, and it enhanced the already significant role that 
they play.87 It elevated the pro-mandatory theme illustrated in the trio of post-
Booker Supreme Court cases from 2007.88 In summarizing the post-Booker era, 
the Court in Peugh wrote that: “The post-Booker federal sentencing scheme aims 
to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the 
Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through the process of 
appellate review.”89  
The Peugh Court highlighted the vital role of the Guidelines, downplaying 
their advisory status.90 Peugh held that since previous opinions established a 
district court must begin sentencing by correctly calculating the applicable 
guidelines range,91 even if the eventual sentence varies from the Guidelines, the 
Guidelines are “in a real sense the basis for the sentence” because they were 
used from the outset.92 Even though a district court can ultimately sentence a 
defendant outside the Guidelines range, this does not deprive the Guidelines of 
their role as the primary force behind the framework for sentencing.93 
Additionally, the Court in Peugh noted that the appellate review for 
reasonableness continues to use the Guidelines as a benchmark in order to 
promote uniformity and “iron out sentencing differences.”94 
In Peugh, Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, highlighted the 
background for the Guidelines in saying that: “The Commission produced the 
now familiar Sentencing Guidelines: a system under which a set of inputs 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013). 
 85. Brown, supra note 82, at 531. 
 86. In fact, the Court notes that treating the Guidelines as mandatory is a procedural error. 
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2080. 
 87. Brown, supra note 82, at 529 (quotations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 532. 
 89. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 
 92. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083 (emphasis added) (quoting Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 
522, 529 (2011)). 
 93. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 94. Id. (quoting Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005)). 
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specific to a given case (the particular characteristics of the offense and offender) 
yielded a predetermined output (a range of months within which the defendant 
could be sentenced).”95 The Guidelines are categorized as a relatively simple 
mathematical equation with inputs and outputs. While the Court in Peugh noted 
that the particular characteristics of an offense and offender are inputs, the output 
is described as “predetermined,”96 because the inputs of particular 
characteristics of offenses and offenders come from the Guidelines themselves, 
which, by nature, cannot account for all possible applicable particular 
characteristics unique to the defendant or the circumstances of the offense.97  
Overall, Peugh supported the notion that the Guidelines represent an 
“authoritative view of the appropriate sentences for specifics crimes”98 and that 
the federal sentencing system itself implements measures intended to make the 
Guidelines the “lodestone of sentencing.”99 Between Peugh and the other post-
Booker cases, the proposition that the Guidelines are “advisory” in nature 
appears questionable.  
III.  THE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT 
A. Original Enactment 
In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress 
instructed the Commission to “amend its sentencing guidelines to provide an 
appropriate enhancement for any felony, whether committed within or outside 
the United States, that involves or is intended to promote international terrorism, 
unless such involvement or intent is itself an element of the crime.”100 In 
response, the Commission enacted § 3A1.4 of the Guidelines.101  
Section 3A1.4, known as the Terrorism Enhancement, is a sentencing 
enhancement which applies if “the offense is a felony that involved, or was 
intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.”102 A federal crime of 
terrorism is defined in two parts.103 First, the definition requires an offense that 
is “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of the government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.”104 Second, 
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the offense must be a violation of at least one of a lengthy list of specifically 
enumerated statutes.105 
B. The Patriot Act Amendment 
Upon passing the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(“Patriot Act”), Congress authorized a noteworthy amendment to § 3A1.4.106 
Under the Patriot Act amendment, the Terrorism Enhancement became 
applicable to crimes that involved terrorism, but otherwise did not fall within the 
federal crime of terrorism definition.107 As a result, even if an offense is not 
listed in the second part of the definition of a federal crime of terrorism under § 
2332b(g)(5)(B), the defendant can still be subject to the Terrorism Enhancement 
so long as “the offense was calculated to influence or affect the conduct of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct.”108 Essentially, the amendment made it possible for the Terrorism 
Enhancement to apply to any criminal act so long as the requisite intent was 
present. 
Even more so, the Patriot Act amendment stretched the Terrorism 
Enhancement to encompass more crimes. Following the Patriot Act amendment, 
the Terrorism Enhancement covered offenses from the list of offenses under § 
2332b(g)(5)(B) although such offenses are not calculated to influence or affect 
the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against 
government conduct, but rather are calculated to, “intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population.”109  
C. Applying the Terrorism Enhancement 
If a court applies the § 3A1.4 Terrorism Enhancement, the minimum 
sentencing range a convicted defendant would face is 210–262 months, which 
is the Guidelines’ sentencing table calculation for a Level 32 offense with a 
Category VI criminal history.110 To visualize, consider this: after the Terrorism 
Enhancement is applied, the sentencing range for a Level 12 base offense jumps 
from ten–sixteen months (at most a little over a year) to 210–262 months (at 
most almost twenty-two years).111 Although the Booker decision categorizes the 
Guidelines as advisory and therefore provides the courts with the potential to 
blunt the sharp effect of a § 3A1.4 enhancement, the sentencing still remains 
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subject to the discretion of district court judges112 and Supreme Court trends, 
which uphold strong support for the Guidelines.113  
If the Terrorism Enhancement under § 3A1.4 applies, the convicted 
defendant’s sentencing level is subject to a twelve level enhancement and if, 
after such enhancement, the resulting offense level is less than thirty-two, it is 
automatically adjusted upward to Level 32.114 In other words, if an offender’s 
crime is initially a base offense level less than 20, then, in applying the Terrorism 
Enhancement, the offense level is immediately increased to Level 32; if the 
offender’s crime has a base level at or above 20, twelve levels are added.115 
Although it is possible for this calculation to result in less than a life sentence, 
practically speaking, the application of the Terrorism Enhancement is likely to 
result in life imprisonment.116  
Additionally, under the Terrorism Enhancement, the defendant’s criminal 
history is automatically a Category VI, the highest category, regardless of the 
defendant’s actual criminal history.117 Ironically, in making the Guidelines, the 
Commission must take criminal history into account, to the extent it is 
relevant,118 but, in applying the Terrorism Enhancement, since criminal history 
is automatically Category VI, criminal history cannot be a factor at all for a 
sentencing judge, regardless of its relevancy.  
IV.  ANALYZING THE USE OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
A. Evaluating Both Sides of the Guidelines 
From the outset, critics have described the Guidelines as “administrative 
handcuffs” for judges.119 Before the introduction of the Guidelines, sentencing 
lacked uniformity. The Guidelines aspired to create uniformity and eradicate the 
effects of “discrimination, judicial idiosyncrasies, and biases in order to promote 
fairness and justice.”120 Although aimed at uniformity, the Guidelines have been 
criticized as taking “away the human element from the sentencing process,” and 
instead inserting “clean, sharp edges of a sentencing slide rule.”121 The 
Guidelines, while aimed at the valiant goal of uniformity in sentencing, have 
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seemed to overstep their bounds into tight rigidity, giving similar sentences to 
cases with important distinctions.122 The legal norms that the Guidelines purport 
to implement cannot, and do not, perfectly represent moral intuitions because, 
by their very nature, moral intuitions vary according to facts and 
circumstances.123 Therefore, the Guidelines can inherently result in sentences 
more severe than society’s moral intuitions call for in certain situations.124 
“Critics contend that the Guidelines virtually abolish consideration of the 
defendant’s character and, instead, require judges to sentence based largely upon 
the offense rather than the offender.”125 On the other hand, supporters maintain 
that some elimination of a defendant’s personal characteristics—such as race 
and economic status—contribute to making the Guidelines fair.126 Remaining 
neutral toward these characteristics helps to limit sentencing disparities.127 In 
initially creating the Guidelines, the Commission sought to narrow judges’ 
discretion and “eliminate the disparities in sentencing that seemed to plague 
federal courts.”128 While a plaguing amount of disparities in sentencing can 
certainly pose an issue, the Guidelines have caused judges and prosecutors to 
lose their ability to effectuate justice in individual cases due to their “allegiance 
to rigid rules.”129 Overall, the Guidelines aimed to meet aspirational goals; 
however, in attempting to do so, they contemporaneously created many 
additional problems which judges grapple with today. 
B. Critiquing the Application of the Terrorism Enhancement 
Many elements of the Terrorism Enhancement create reason for alarm. It is 
well noted, and in fact fundamental to the purpose of an enhancement in general, 
that it can drastically increase a sentence. Over seven percent of terrorism cases 
result in life sentences, which is three times the rate of generic criminal cases.130 
The automatic Category VI criminal history plays an important role in the 
resulting high sentences. Since criminal history is automatically Category VI, an 
offender’s actual criminal history cannot be a factor at all, regardless of 
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relevancy, for a sentencing judge.131 Offenders without a criminal history must 
suddenly be credited with one.  
Judges have found the criminal history impact of the Terrorism 
Enhancement troublesome. For example, Judge George O’Toole, a U.S. District 
Court Judge for the District of Massachusetts, was concerned about the 
unfairness of the predetermined criminal history.132 Judge O’Toole expressed 
his concern saying that, “the automatic assignment of the defendant to a 
Criminal History Category VI . . . is not only too blunt an instrument to have 
genuine analytical value, it is fundamentally at odds with the design of the 
Guidelines. It can, as it does in this case, import a fiction into the calculus.”133 
As a result, Judge O’Toole chose to disregard the Terrorism Enhancement in 
sentencing.134 Similarly, Judge Daniel Crabtree, a U.S. District Court Judge for 
the District of Kansas, has found the automatic criminal history element of the 
Terrorism Enhancement to be unsettling, especially for offenders without any 
prior criminal history.135 Beyond that, Judge Clay D. Land, a U.S. District Court 
Judge for the Middle District of Georgia, observed that a three category increase 
from the offender’s actual Category III criminal history to Category VI was still 
worrisome.136 Judge Land found that the automatic increase under the Terrorism 
Enhancement “ignores the individual ‘history and characteristics’ of the 
Defendant, and instead places too much weight on a questionable interpretation 
of what constitutes a federal crime of terrorism under the Guidelines.”137 As 
such, he opted not to apply the Terrorism Enhancement because he could not 
justify its application, instead finding it “excessive.”138  
In summary, the Terrorism Enhancement reflects Congress’s effort to 
accurately compensate for the severity that society associates with terrorism.139 
However, this “one size fits all” approach, which grants one criminal history to 
all offenders, risks backlash from judges who choose to refuse to consider the 
Terrorism Enhancement because it is too severe.140 While some judges 
recognize the propensity for the automatic criminal history to create overly harsh 
sentences and take measures to avoid such a result, not all judges may feel this 
way or even feel willing to disagree with the Guidelines, although it is in their 
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power to do so. There is a risk that judges will feel obligated to apply the 
Terrorism Enhancement anyways or decide that the problematic nature of the 
criminal history element is not enough to disregard the Terrorism Enhancement 
all together.  
Additionally, critics contend that the use of the automatic Category VI 
criminal history undermines the fundamental purposes for which the Guidelines 
were established in the first place: fairness and equality.141 Without recognizing 
an offender’s actual criminal history and instead imputing a level of criminality, 
an offender with a serious criminal history is treated the same as one with a clean 
past. It is unfair that someone who has managed to stay out of trouble is treated 
the same as someone who has not only failed to do so, but has failed multiple 
times to do so. Also, as a result of the automatic criminal history component of 
the Terrorism Enhancement, criminal history is not given equal opportunity for 
consideration in sentencing. In some contexts, such as diminished capacity, the 
seriousness of a defendant’s criminal history can prohibit a judge from 
departure.142 Therefore, a serious actual criminal history can hurt an offender, 
however, in the context of the Terrorism Enhancement, a less serious, sometimes 
non-existent, criminal history cannot help an offender. 
Critics of the Terrorism Enhancement also fear that consistent application 
would essentially create a mandatory minimum sentence for terrorism 
offenses,143 of which there are many, with some not even statutorily terrorism 
but still falling under the purview of the Terrorism Enhancement.144 
Mathematically, the combination of a high base offense level (Level 32) and the 
highest criminal history category (Category VI) ensures this minimum sentence 
result.145 In response, legal scholars have described the Terrorism Enhancement 
as “draconian” and as a cause of disproportionate sentencing because it treats a 
wide range of crimes alike.146 In doing so, the Terrorism Enhancement 
compromises the “gradation of offenses” in that a terrorist is a terrorist 
regardless of the underlying crime.147 Essentially, it takes away the ability to 
differentiate among terrorists who commit different crimes.148 
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More critiques arise beyond the Terrorism Enhancement’s automatic 
criminal history feature and its potential for a high mandatory minimum 
sentence, both of which contribute to its ability to drastically increase a sentence. 
For one, as a result of the Patriot Act amendment, sentencing judges can apply 
the Terrorism Enhancement even if a defendant was not convicted of a terrorism 
act per se.149 Thus, judges maintain wide-ranging power and expanded 
discretion in sentencing because even if a defendant cannot be linked to a 
specific act of terrorism, the Terrorism Enhancement and its heightened sentence 
can still apply.150  
With that, the already vague and broad definition of a “federal crime of 
terrorism” became vaguer and far more expansive. Congress attempted to turn 
terrorism into a legal term “operationalized through precise legal provisions,” 
but in doing so, it may have taken on a near impossible challenge because no 
consensus on the definition of terrorism exists.151 In defining “federal crime of 
terrorism” in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), Congress chose its own challenge, 
and instead of truly identifying what it sought to punish, Congress opted to 
vaguely seek “tougher sentences for a range of existing crimes when they were 
motivated by terrorist impulses.”152  
Critics have also observed that the Terrorism Enhancement has problematic 
purposes behind its problematic effects.153 It has been noted that the drastically 
enhanced sentences in terrorism cases are problematic because they are often 
used to send overly harsh messages, more so than the deterrence message 
illustrated in typical criminal cases.154 Additionally, critics of the Terrorism 
Enhancement have discerned that it can be used as a “bargaining chip” to strong-
arm a desired result.155 At times, the government will recommend a reduced 
sentence because of cooperation, and at other times, if a defendant defaulted on 
his/her agreement to cooperate, then the government chooses to seek the 
Terrorism Enhancement.156 Such a use poses a major issue because in 
determining who is and who is not treated as a terrorist, policy and principle may 
not always be at the forefront of the government’s decision.157 The government’s 
motive behind such use of the Terrorism Enhancement does not squarely aim to 
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punish terrorism,158 it puts conditions on doing so and, at times, is punishing a 
lack of cooperation more so than punishing terrorism.  
C. Accounting for Vulnerability and Mental Condition in the Guidelines 
Knowing that the rules provided for in the Guidelines could not possibly 
account for every situation, the Guidelines were supplemented with potential 
deviations from explicit sentences and the judicial discretion to execute them.159 
As such, it is evident that the Guidelines, alongside its quest for uniformity, 
sought to accomplish more than punishment for criminal conduct.160 Numerous 
provisions of the Guidelines account for vulnerability, mental capacity, 
blameworthiness, and mental and emotional conditions. 
1. The Vulnerable Victim Enhancement 
The Terrorism Enhancement of § 3A1.4 is not the only enhancement of the 
sentencing guidelines; it is one of many. Under § 3A1.1, another enhancement, 
known as the Vulnerable Victim Enhancement, allows for a two-level increase 
in an offense level if a defendant “knew or should have known that a victim of 
the offense was a vulnerable victim.”161 Under the enhancement, “vulnerable 
victim” is defined as a person “who is a victim of the offense of conviction and 
any conduct for which the defendant is accountable,” and who is “unusually 
vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise 
particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.”162 However, there is nothing 
in the Guidelines that specifically calls for the downward departure or reduction 
in sentence for offenders who are “unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or 
mental condition, or . . . otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal 
conduct” and are not the main perpetrator of an offense.163 
2. Diminished Capacity 
Another circumstance for which the Guidelines warrant deviance from the 
base level sentencing is for diminished capacity.164 The Guidelines provide that 
“a downward departure may be warranted if (1) the defendant committed the 
offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity; and (2) the 
significantly reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the 
commission of the offense.”165 The Guidelines define “significantly reduced 
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mental capacity” to mean that a defendant has a “significantly impaired ability 
to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to 
exercise the power of reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows 
is wrongful.”166 If a judge finds that a departure is warranted for diminished 
capacity, the extent of the departure should reflect the degree to which the 
reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.167  
The four exceptions168 for downward departure for diminished capacity 
preclude departure in many cases, and, within the limited number of cases where 
departure is not precluded by such limitations, trial courts have not often 
departed downward.169 Moreover, some courts have maintained that considering 
the diminished capacity departure is evidence that the Commission has 
adequately considered circumstances for downward departure relating to mental 
conditions, and thus disqualifying mental conditions from consideration for 
departure under § 5K2.0 of the Guidelines.170 Such a holding raises the concern 
that mental conditions will not receive adequate consideration on their own 
without being linked to an explicit provision of the Guidelines which account 
for them, such as the provision for diminished capacity.  
3. Aberrant Behavior 
The Guidelines also allow for departure in cases of aberrant behavior.171 In 
order to qualify for the departure for aberrant behavior, a defendant must have 
committed a single criminal offense that “(1) was committed without significant 
planning; (2) was of limited duration; and (3) represents a marked deviation by 
the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life.”172 The aberrant behavior 
departure does not apply to certain named offenses.173 It also does not apply if 
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certain offense characteristics are present under the circumstances, including 
serious bodily injury, death, use of a firearm, and drug trafficking.174 Lastly, the 
departure cannot apply if certain offender characteristics are present, including 
criminal history level and past convictions.175  
In determining whether or not to depart under the Guidelines’ aberrant 
behavior departure, a sentencing judge may consider aspects of a particular 
defendant, including mental and emotion conditions, employment record, record 
of prior good works, motivation for committing the offense, and efforts to 
mitigate the effects of the offense.176 In part, mental conditions are factored into 
aberrant behavior departures because many mental conditions cause those 
affected to be unable to perceive the consequences or likely outcome of their 
actions. Logically, the inability to perceive consequences may be present in the 
commission of a crime which “(1) was committed without significant planning; 
(2) was of limited duration; and (3) represents a marked deviation by the 
defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life.”177 The aberrant behavior 
departure allows for departure based on mental condition and indicates another 
area in which the Guidelines provide for lessening in sentencing where 
vulnerability and lack of moral culpability may be present. 
4. Inadequacy of Criminal History Category 
Section 4A1.3, which allows for departure based on criminal history, 
indicates that the Guidelines concede that a particular defendant’s criminal 
history may be an inadequate indicator of either the seriousness of the 
defendant’s criminal history or the defendant’s likelihood to commit other 
crimes.178 For example, a defendant who was previously sentenced under lenient 
treatment but has a record with an extensive record of serious, assaultive conduct 
might have the same criminal history category as a defendant with a record of 
less serious conduct.179 The inadequacy in criminal history may be remedied by 
an upward departure or a downward departure, depending on if the defendant’s 
criminal history is under-representative or over-representative of seriousness 
and likelihood to recidivate.180  
Prohibitions on downward departure for this basis exist if the defendant is 
an armed career offender or a repeat and dangerous sex offender.181 
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Additionally, it is prohibited to downward depart below Category I, the lowest 
criminal history category.182 However, under the Guidelines, a court can 
technically depart upward from Category VI, even though Category VI is the 
highest criminal history category.183 In doing so, a court structures the departure 
by moving along the sentencing table to the next higher offense level, while 
staying in the Category VI column, until it reaches an appropriate guideline 
range.184 
Overall, the policy behind § 4A1.3 supports the notion that sentencing 
should adequately and accurately reflect the blameworthiness of the offender. 
As such, if a defendant’s criminal history—which plays a vital role in 
determining a sentence, especially with regard for the Terrorism 
Enhancement—does not adequately and accurately reflect the offender’s 
blameworthiness, a court has the means to adjust accordingly in order to reach 
just punishment.  
V.  THE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT IN CASES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: UNITED 
STATES V. BLAIR 
A. Facts and Outcome 
In United States v. Blair,185 the twenty-nine-year-old defendant, Alexander 
Blair (“Blair”), pled guilty to conspiracy186 after lending $100 to friend and 
prospective terrorist, John Booker, Jr. (“Booker”), so that Booker could rent a 
storage locker to hold what Booker believed were bomb-making materials.187 
Blair suffered from a genetic condition called Williams syndrome.188 Blair’s 
attorney, Christopher Joseph, commented that the condition made him “easily 
manipulated and unable to appreciate the gravity of his conduct.”189 In 
explaining the effects of Williams syndrome, the defense expert testified that it 
caused Blair to function at the level of an eleven-year-old.190 In their statement, 
the Blair family explained that Williams syndrome affects many aspects of 
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physical health, mental health, and decision making.191 The U.S. National 
Library of Medicine concurs, saying that Williams syndrome affects many parts 
of the body, and it also notes that affected individuals tend to take an extreme 
interest in other people.192 
Going back to as early as October 2014, Booker had been communicating 
his desire to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”) to a person 
who, unbeknownst to Booker, was an FBI informant.193 Booker was committed 
to carrying out an act of violence in support of Jihad and even took steps to build 
a bomb, planning to detonate it on the Fort Riley Military Institution.194 Blair 
first met Booker in early 2015 after he began attending the Islamic Center of 
Topeka.195 After developing a friendship, Blair became aware of Booker’s 
radical beliefs and plan to commit an act of violence.196 In March 2015, Blair 
loaned Booker $100 to rent a storage unit, which Booker used for storing what 
he believed to be bomb materials.197 FBI informants, whose real motives and 
alliance were still unbeknownst to Booker, worked with him to build what 
Booker believed to be a workable bomb and then even accompanied him to a 
place to detonate the inert device, where Booker was subsequently arrested.198 
Immediately following his arrest, FBI agents contacted and interviewed Blair.199 
In the interview, Blair explained that he did not like what Booker was doing and 
made it clear to Booker that he would not personally participate—he simply 
thought of his $100 loan as helping out a friend in need.200 
At trial, the Assistant U.S. Attorney urged the district court judge, Judge 
Daniel D. Crabtree, to sentence Blair to five years in prison,201 the statutory 
maximum for conspiracy.202 Contrarily, Blair’s attorney urged for Judge 
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Crabtree to sentence Blair to probation.203 Blair’s attorney argued that a prison 
sentence would “exacerbate his developmental issues and do little to deter future 
terrorist acts.”204 Data shows that life behind bars is likely to exacerbate 
conditions of the mentally ill, like Blair.205 Additionally, conditions may 
deteriorate as a result of inadequate treatment.206 The Blair family advocated for 
a non-prison sentence because “placing him in prison will expose him to a life 
that could seriously harm him, take away his loving, empathetic nature and good 
heart that he now possesses.”207 
In the end, Judge Crabtree sentenced Blair to fifteen months in prison, 
followed by two years of supervised release.208 Judge Crabtree struggled with 
the decision, which he finally made in October 2016 after previously delaying 
the sentencing twice.209 He called it “one of the most unique, nuanced decisions” 
of his career210 because of the aspects at play—including Blair’s mental illness. 
While Judge Crabtree did ultimately sentence Blair to prison, he did so with the 
effect it would have on Blair in mind. In his judgment, Judge Crabtree 
recommended that Blair be designated to Springfield MCFP to serve his 
imprisonment, in part so that Blair could “receive the care and treatment 
necessary to address the limitations and concerns raised by his mental health.”211 
After dealing with the Guidelines and the Terrorism Enhancement, Judge 
Crabtree opined his displeasure with the Guidelines, calling them unfair and 
claiming that they made no sense.212 Particularly, Judge Crabtree took issue with 
the criminal history aspect of the Terrorism Enhancement.213 Although Blair 
lacked any prior arrest or conviction and Judge Crabtree found that Blair did 
“not represent a future danger to the community,” he still classified Blair’s 
criminal history as a Category VI, the highest level, because Blair’s offense 
furthered a crime of terrorism—that crime being Booker’s crime, not Blair’s 
own.214 Even though Judge Crabtree disagreed with the application of the 
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Terrorism Enhancement to Blair’s criminal history, he claimed he felt obligated 
to enforce it.215 
The interrelation between manipulation, Blair’s condition, and his crime 
were well documented through the trial and sentencing. During sentencing, 
Judge Crabtree commented on the role that Blair’s genetic condition played, 
saying, “I have no doubt this condition made Mr. Blair more susceptible to Mr. 
Booker’s manipulation.”216 Blair’s lawyers contended that because Williams 
syndrome results in an inability to process social cues and a compulsion to 
maintain friendships, Blair was more vulnerable to manipulation from people 
like Booker.217 Regarding the connection between Blair’s condition and 
Booker’s manipulation, the Blair family believed that Blair’s condition was the 
only reason he committed the crime.218 Throughout its statement, the Blair 
family explained that Booker manipulated Blair throughout their friendship, 
claiming that “Booker called the shots and [Blair] followed like a puppy.”219  
B. Post-Sentencing Analysis 
The Blair case exemplifies a step in the right direction toward sentencing 
offenders with mental illness who play a limited role in the commission of 
crimes that can fall under the Terrorism Enhancement. In sentencing Blair to 
fifteen months in prison and two years of supervised release,220 Judge Crabtree 
struck a balance between the government’s desired sentence of five years in 
prison and Blair’s lawyer’s plea for probation.221 In recommending a specific 
prison that he believed would get Blair the necessary treatment,222 Judge 
Crabtree also did his best to account for what was most worrisome about prison 
to Blair’s family and lawyers—exacerbation of his condition.223 He did not 
diminish the importance of the rehabilitation in punishment and implemented a 
character-based sentencing scheme which maintained a retributive focus in 
requiring just punishment that also reflected the offender’s desert.224 Judge 
Crabtree’s sentence properly reflects the extent to which Blair was deserving of 
punishment. It acknowledges the fact that Blair played a very limited role and 
made it clear he would not participate further. Overall, Judge Crabtree took into 
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consideration all of the unique elements of the Blair case and tailored the 
sentence appropriately.  
Judge Crabtree’s criticism of the Terrorism Enhancement225 encourages 
other judges to not hide behind the ease and uniformity of the Guidelines, but 
instead analyze their elements with a forward-thinking perspective—one which 
accounts for the mental conditions of an offender. The complexity of the 
situation could have incentivized Judge Crabtree to favor the ease and efficiency 
of the Guidelines, but he did not. He took his time to contemplate how to handle 
“one of the most unique, nuanced decisions” of his career.226  
While the Blair case may not shed light on the treatment of the Guidelines 
overall, with regards to the Terrorism Enhancement, it illustrates that its severity 
catches the eye of judges and is often met with concern. As such, even though 
trends from Supreme Court cases indicate that the Guidelines are positioned as 
close to law,227 the core advisory nature of the Guidelines is not lost on judges 
dealing with the Terrorism Enhancement and seeing its ability to drastically 
increase a sentence.228 That is not to say that the Guidelines are not of assistance 
to sentencing judges. In some cases, such as with the Terrorism Enhancement, 
being forced to consider the Guidelines first may point out alarming severity in 
sentencing and, from there, work as a benchmark.229 
C. The Future for Cases with Mental Illness and the Terrorism Enhancement 
In the case of the Terrorism Enhancement, especially in differentiating 
between offenders with mental illness and those without, inordinate consistency 
comes at too high a cost. Although terrorism is perceived as more serious than 
other crimes and accordingly more deserving of more severe sentences, such a 
contention cannot universally apply to the myriad of offenses which are capable 
of getting caught in the sentencing wrath of the Terrorism Enhancement. At a 
certain point, the punishment needs to fit more than just the crime; it needs to fit 
the criminal. Currently, under the Guidelines, there is a focus on departure when 
conduct does not fit the norm, but a lack of focus on when the offender does not 
fit the norm.  
1. Factoring in Mental Illness to Sentencing 
In the future, as mental health becomes less stigmatized, courts more and 
more will be forced to consider the role it plays in the commission of crimes. 
Policy initiatives are already reevaluating how offenders with mental illness 
should be treated. In early 2013, then-mayor of New York City, Michael 
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Bloomberg, asked judges to consider the defendant’s mental health status and 
prioritize treatment over prison where possible.230 Bloomberg’s initiative came 
following a report that found the mentally ill were costing New York City three 
times as much as other inmates.231 However, cost is not the only concern with 
sentencing the mentally ill to prison. The susceptibility of the mentally ill to 
harm in prison has also raised concerns.232 It is well noted that individuals with 
mental illness are vulnerable to victimization in the outside world, but they are 
also more susceptible than people without mental illness to physical and sexual 
assault in prison.233 
As a means to decrease the cost and harm of imprisonment for offenders 
with mental illness, mental illness should be a required factor to consider during 
sentencing. Currently, mental conditions may be taken into account if relevant, 
and then, only to the extent that they are relevant.234 The Guidelines contend that 
mental conditions may be relevant if, “individually or in combination with other 
offender characteristics, they are present to an unusual degree and distinguish 
the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”235 Given that mental 
illness often affects many aspects of decision making236 and creates 
vulnerability, mental illness should always be relevant in sentencing, regardless 
of whether it is present to an unusual degree or not. The degree of relevancy will 
likely change for each offender and each circumstance, however, in any case, its 
relevancy will always be a basis to warrant consideration of mental illness as a 
factor in sentencing. The vulnerability resulting from mental illness needs to 
factor into the severity of a contemplated sentence to ensure that an offender is 
not over-punished237 and has the opportunity for rehabilitation. 
In considering mental illness in sentencing, judges may look to other 
provisions of the Guidelines that account for and allow departures for mental 
conditions, mental capacity, and moral culpability, such as the provisions for 
vulnerable victims, diminished capacity, and aberrant behavior.238 These 
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provisions are based on a lack of blameworthiness because of a lack of 
understanding of the situation or consequences of the conduct involved.239 The 
same policy supports considering mental illness in sentencing. Consideration of 
mental illness is not a guarantee for departure, but it opens the doors for 
departure. Opportunity for departure is much needed, and thus should be 
required, when sentences have opportunity for severe enhancement, as with the 
Terrorism Enhancement.  
2. Departing Based on a Mentally Ill Offenders’ Role in an Offense 
Currently, under the Guidelines, a defendant’s role in an offense cannot be 
a basis for departing from a particular guideline range.240 In the context of the 
Terrorism Enhancement and offenders with mental illness, this is particularly 
troublesome. A severe sentence can be placed on an offender whose 
vulnerability was exploited, and even if the offender played a small role in an 
offense, it is irrelevant.  
In Booker, the Court explained that the intended uniformity of the 
Guidelines was not merely in similar sentences for those convicted of violations 
of the same statute, but rather should emanate with similar relationships between 
sentences and real conduct.241 In the context of the over-encompassing grasp of 
the Terrorism Enhancement, the harmfulness of conduct or the blameworthiness 
of a particular defendant who has mental health issues is more important than 
the fact that the offense can fall under the wide net cast by the vague definition 
of a “federal crime of terrorism.” The “real conduct,” including the role of the 
offender, should play a bigger role in sentencing than the implicated statute.  
People with mental illness carry the burden of a dangerous risk of being 
exploited, even slightly, for the commission of a crime. Following this, in the 
context of the Terrorism Enhancement, offenders with mental illness run the risk 
of having such exploitation lead to a severe sentence for a crime stretched to 
meet the vague definition of a federal crime of terrorism. To mitigate these risks, 
the role of an offender with mental illness should be available as a means for 
departure. 
In particular, if a defendant suffering from mental illness is found to have 
been a “vulnerable victim” of another, making the defendant a vulnerable 
offender in committing the offense, there should be an opportunity for downward 
departure. In the Guidelines’ definition of “vulnerable victim,” the victim must 
be unusually vulnerable “due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is 
otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.”242 People with 
mental illness are unusually vulnerable under this standard.  
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In the definition provided of a vulnerable victim, the Guidelines 
acknowledge that mental conditions result in unusual vulnerability which makes 
a person particularly susceptible to criminal conduct.243 This holds true 
regardless of whether the person is a victim of a crime or an offender; the 
situation of the person may change, but the effect of his or her mental condition 
does not. Even as an offender, mental conditions create a special degree of 
vulnerability which often leads to manipulation. The vulnerability associated 
with people afflicted with mental conditions can lead them to be targeted not 
only as victims, but also as accomplices or conspirators. However, the 
Guidelines only provide a possible enhancement to account for the former,244 
but no such reciprocal downward adjustment to account for the latter. When an 
offender afflicted with mental illness is vulnerable and another offender preys 
on this vulnerability to involve the mentally ill offender in his or her offense, 
particularly when the role is minor, there needs to be room for downward 
departure.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Guidelines are evolutionary in nature,245 and reflect, “congressional 
awareness that sentencing is a dynamic field that requires continuing review.”246 
The Guidelines, in their current state, require review and adaptation. Public 
concern about terrorism is reflected in the severity of the Terrorism 
Enhancement, but it drastically overstates the reality of the threat of terrorism in 
America. Accordingly, the Terrorism Enhancement has been built to be broad 
and vague enough to combat this fear with severe sentencing for almost any 
crime. In many cases, the Terrorism Enhancement drastically overstates fair and 
necessary punishment for defendants and their conduct. Although this is 
generally concerning, it is particularly concerning for offenders with mental 
illness because they have the propensity to struggle with decision making and 
lack a full understanding of the situation and its consequences.  
There’s an elephant in the room: no one wants to appear weak on 
terrorism.247 However, in recognizing the reality of terrorism and moving toward 
managing, rather than defeating,248 it, judges need to appropriately consider an 
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offender’s mental illness in sentencing. The Blair case presents an example for 
properly factoring mental illness into sentencing in that it accounts for treatment 
and rehabilitation and departed both from the Terrorism Enhancement and the 
statutory maximum for the offense. At the outset, one specific purpose of the 
Commission was to develop sentences that reflect advancement in knowledge 
of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.249 Advancements 
in knowledge of human behavior have led to the conclusion that mental illness 
creates susceptibility to harm and vulnerability to manipulation. The 
Commission needs to create sentences to reflect this conclusion. In the 
meantime, courts have the ability to rectify the risks of harm, vulnerability, and 
manipulation that mental illness causes, both in the real world and in prison, but 
they cannot do so without considering mental illness as a factor in sentencing.  
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Rita v. United States, “[t]he 
Commission’s work is ongoing.”250 Any work not done yet is left in the hands 
of the court, which, after Booker, is armed with the discretion to make a 
difference—the discretion to combat unrealistic public fears of terrorism, to 
adequately address the stigma of mental illness, and to accurately account for 
unique aspects of conduct that come with it. It is left to the courts to use this 
discretion to consider mental illness in sentencing and when sentencing a 
defendant with mental illness, whose vulnerability was exploited by another in 
committing the offense, depart downward from the possibly severe results of the 
Terrorism Enhancement.  
MELISSA POWERS* 
  
 
isis/ [https://perma.cc/4YAH-DKNT] (“If we want to reduce the long-term risk of terrorism—and 
reduce its ability to twist Western societies into unrecognizable caricatures of themselves—we need 
to stop viewing terrorism as shocking and aberrational, and instead recognize it as an ongoing 
problem to be managed, rather than ‘defeated.’”). 
 249. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2012). 
 250. 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007). 
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thank you to Marcia McCormick 
for her valuable help and guidance as a faculty advisor. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
968 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:939 
 
